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 
Abstract—Cost overruns are a persistent problem in oil and gas 
megaprojects. Whilst the extant literature is filled with studies on 
incidents and causes of cost overruns, underlying theories to explain 
their emergence in oil and gas megaprojects are few. Yet, a way to 
contain the syndrome of cost overruns is to understand the bases of 
‘how and why’ they occur. Such knowledge will also help to develop 
pragmatic techniques for better overall management of oil and gas 
megaprojects. The aim of this paper is to explain the development of 
cost overruns in hydrocarbon megaprojects through the perspective of 
chaos theory. The underlying principles of chaos theory and its 
implications for cost overruns are examined and practical 
recommendations proposed. In addition, directions for future research 
in this fertile area provided. 
 
Keywords—Chaos theory, oil and gas, cost overruns, 
megaprojects. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ESPITE innovations in the management theories and 
practice, cost overruns persist as a major concern within 
oil and gas megaprojects [1]-[5]. In 2012, Chevron declared a 
cost overrun of AU$9 billion on its Gorgon Liquefied Natural 
Gas project and a revised estimated cost of the project to be 
AU$52 billion, which represented a 40% increase on their 
original 2009 budget [6]. In fact during 2012, companies such 
as Chevron, Woodside, BG, Santos and Exxon Mobil 
experienced a combined total of $25 billion in cost overruns in 
Australia alone [7].  
As a result of cost overrun on its Pluto Liquefied Natural 
Gas (LNG) project, Woodside experienced significant fall in 
its share value and its assets worth declined by AU$1 billion. 
Experiences such as this have meant that owners of oil and gas 
megaprojects are now wiser. A common course of action in 
avoiding such eventuality has been to put extreme pressure on 
operators, contractors and service providers to enhance their 
performance and productivity in order to remain competitive 
in global markets [8]. Previous studies have described cost 
overruns by focusing on an array of exogenous factors, which 
include logistical challenges in remote locations, wage costs, 
regulatory complexity and technical challenges [8]. However, 
comprehensive understanding of cost overrun requires study 
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on both exogenous and endogenous factors contributing to its 
development [4], [9]. According to [9], the push to produce oil 
or gas often results in decision-makers becoming less risk 
averse. Consequently, they commit errors that manifest 
themselves as rework and potentially impact on project cost.  
Oil and gas projects are generally characterised with 
uncertainties and these impact their cost performance [10]-
[11]. For this reason, they are difficult to manage. The use of 
conventional project management tools and techniques to 
deliver projects often leads to undesirable outcomes [12]. This 
is because these tools and techniques are designed to manage 
projects with highly defined components, rooted in certainty 
[13]. Accordingly, more sophisticated perspectives need to be 
developed to better understand how to manage uncertainties 
that are inherent within oil and gas megaprojects [14]. 
Chaos theory has long been suggested as a useful principle 
that reconciles the essential interdependencies within 
uncertain events’ causatives [15]. It is proposed that the 
principles of chaos theory can provide contextual backdrop for 
understanding the emergence of cost overruns in oil and gas 
megaprojects. The paper commences with an in-depth review 
of extant literature on the chaos theory and its characteristics. 
Then, chaos theory is used to explain how oil and gas 
megaprojects experience cost overruns. Finally, the 
implications of this study for practice are discussed. 
II. CHAOS THEORY 
Chaos can be defined as a state of great randomness, 
disorderliness or confusion/ uncertainty [16]. In addition, 
chaos theory deals with the conduct of dynamic systems which 
contain non-linear components and cannot be predicted in the 
future [17]. A dynamic system has been defined as a system 
that is characterised by continuous change over time and can 
be stable or unstable [18].  
Chaos theory is a direct contrast to linear or mechanistic 
thinking, which explains systems are regular, even, stable and 
predictable [17]. The difference between linearity and 
nonlinearity is the presence of nonspecific and 
disproportionate effect in the latter [19]. Chaos theory has 
challenged the world of linearity: it has shown that only 
limited naturally occurring events can be explained by 
traditional models [20]. Linearity asserts that causes and 
effects within a system have a proportional relationship i.e. the 
effect of an action is directly proportional to the magnitude of 
the force producing the action [17]. In opposite, chaos theory 
seeks to understand the behaviour of systems that fail to 
proceed in a traditional cause-and-effect manner [21]. 
Chaos theory contradicts conventional project management 
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theory – where the latter defines project management success 
as depending on many variables which include: planning 
method, schedule management, quality control or 
management, use of technology, communication method or 
management, leadership, human resources management, and 
monitoring and control management [22]. It has been 
suggested that conventional project management theory is 
based on the mechanistic and deterministic philosophy of 
Newtonian physics, which asserts world equilibrium and a 
predictable structure that is orderly, stable, and rational [23]. 
However, chaos theory is radically different. Chaos Theory is 
based on the principle that within a predictable structure, an 
element of behaviour can never be predicted fully and is 
capable of causing disorderliness, instability and irrationality 
within the structure [24]-[25]. 
III. CHARACTERISTICS OF CHAOS THEORY 
Plethora views of the characteristics of chaos theory have 
been discussed in different ways by different authors. 
However, Table I presents most common attributes of chaos 
theory found in the literature. They are: (i) sensitive 
dependence on initial conditions; (ii) positive feedback 
mechnism; (iii) bifurcation and catastrophic phase changes; 
and (iv) strange attractors.  
A. Sensitive Dependence on Initial Conditions 
Sensitive dependence on initial conditions, otherwise 
known as the butterfly effect assumes small influences can 
cause significant consequences which cannot be predicted 
[17]. An oil and gas megaproject is highly sensitive to change 
[26]. A small change to the system such as a delay in the 
completion of an activity may have significant effect on a 
company’s financial performance. A particular change in the 
oil and gas megaproject system may easily be overlooked 
because it is perceived as insignificant. However, long-time 
effects of such change may be difficult to predict in a 
megaproject where there is a high degree of reciprocal 
interdependence between stakeholders and activities are 
undertaken concurrently. For instance, where a change is 
effected from a partner in the joint ventures, the change may 
produce a domino effect on the other partners and eventually 
lead to extra costs being incurred.  
 
TABLE I 
CHARACTERISTICS OF CHAOS THEORY 
Attributes Descriptions Authors 
Sensitive 
dependence on 
initial conditions 
A situation whereby small change in a 
system causes major and unpredictable 
consequence 
[20], [17]  
 
Positive feedback 
mechanism. 
A process by which negative consequence 
in a system is amplified by actions taken 
otherwise to reduce it 
[21], [20]  
 
Bifurcation and 
catastrophic phase 
changes  
 
A process of sudden qualitative 
modifications in the nature of a system 
caused by radical shifts in the system’s 
conditions 
[17], [20] 
Strange attractors A process by which a system self-organizes 
into order after undergoing series of changes
[17], [21] 
 
 
B. Positive Feedback Mechanism 
System stability is achieved by means of negative feedback 
in which corrective action is needed to prevent deviation from 
a system’s static state [21] . Contrastingly in chaos theory, a 
system is built up by means of positive feedback, that is, 
where the future state of the system is dependent upon the 
initial or earlier conditions [19]. Activities such as those that 
are performed within a project (e.g. cost management, risk 
management, communication management, scheduling and 
quality management) continue to support themselves, leading 
to positive reinforcing cycles or positive feedback loops [27]. 
Negative (i.e., regulates or corrects) and positive (i.e., 
amplifies deviations) feedback can cause major changes to the 
existing conditions of a system as well as continuously 
introduce new patterns of behaviour [28]. In the case of oil 
and gas megaproject, its implementation within specified 
environmental objectives may lead to the selection of 
technology that can contribute to the occurrence of cost 
overrun. For example, according to the North Caspian 
Operating Company Business Ventures (a company acting on 
behalf of Consortium partners including KMG, Eni, Shell, 
ExxonMobil, Total, Conoco and Inpex.), environmental 
concerns caused the use of special technology to trench, lay 
and backfill simultaneously in Kashagan oil and gas 
megaprojects [29]. The application of such technology is 
presenting the consortium partners with an array of technical 
challenges that are increasing the cost of the project. 
C. Positive Feedback Mechanism 
Bifurcation can be defined as “a process of sudden 
qualitative modifications in the nature of a system, which are 
caused by continuous variations in the system’s conditions 
p.259 [17]. Sellnow et al. [30] state that bifurcation 
“represents the flashpoints of change where a system’s 
direction, character, and/or structure are fundamentally 
disrupted” leading to formation of new ones (p.271). 
Bifurcation occurs when a system moves from a periodic to a 
chaotic state as a result of changes being made to its initial 
conditions [17]. 
Murphy [21] suggests a dynamical system such as a 
construction and engineering project evolves from an apparent 
state of orderliness to randomness, and that such system often 
appears to follow characteristic patterns, which may trigger a 
state of ‘total’ disorder. A system achieves a state of ‘total’ 
disorder when it no longer follows characteristic change 
patterns. This often takes place when bifurcations occur at 
intervals, and the system lacks the resources to accommodate 
the developments arising from its uncharacteristic change 
patterns [31]. Before a project system bifurcates (i.e. a system 
in its original state), it often manifest a stable pattern, that has 
underlying conditions, which cannot be altered simply by 
making changes to its original state (e.g. the schedule) [32]. At 
such stage, deterministic actions may be used to return the 
system back into its original order. Initial bifurcation occurs 
when changes made to the project create two new patterns in 
which it settles into. For example, a new partner joining a 
megaproject could alter the existing project arrangement and 
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create two arrangements. Also, the two patterns created during 
the first bifurcation split further into additional stable patterns 
during a second bifurcation. At this state, the system may still 
adapt to changes made to its initial conditions until it reaches a 
point known as the ‘edge of chaos’. 
When a system experiences repeated bifurcations, it 
becomes saturated with an infinite number (nth) of potentially 
stable patterns. Such system is not likely to settle down until it 
lapses into a chaotic state. At the bifurcation point, a system 
rearranges itself into a new hybrid order which may be 
significantly different from its prior order [21], [30]. 
Bifurcation implies change scenarios; but there are different 
forms of change in engineering management systems. Change 
could be emergent, strategic, planned and unplanned [33]. 
This means that bifurcation occurs in various forms, 
depending on the nature of change. Sudden changes or radical 
shifts in a system are referred to as catastrophic changes or 
‘tipping points’ [17]  
Speakman and Sharpley [34] describe major changes in a 
project system as potentially catastrophic crisis events that 
trigger major shifts in project management processes. Murphy 
[21] indicates that whilst it is possible to predict the 
occurrence of bifurcations, their outcomes are impossible to 
predict. Thus, by induction, while project participants may 
foresee impending crisis, predicting the end results is far less 
certain. 
D. Strange Attractors 
Nonlinear system is unpredictable, however, it does not 
completely lack pattern [35], [36]. Attractors are the 
characteristic pattern of the process by which “a system self-
organizes into coherence and adapts to maintain, sustain or 
recreate order when subject to change from either internal 
functioning or external influence” p. 831 [36]. According to 
Murphy [21] an attractor is an organizing principle that a 
system will always metamorphose into a specific form 
irrespective of the level of randomness it may experience. A 
change to the original plan of a project, such as an error in the 
engineering design, can lead to series of other changes. For 
instance, it can cause changes in the construction plan and 
subsequently disrupt the entire project system. Despite being 
in a state of chaos, a project system may still manage to 
organize into an order in between the chaotic condition. 
Although the project system may appear orderly, it can still be 
difficult to predict its next behaviour especially as new 
changes may arise [37]. 
IV. OIL AND GAS MEGAPROJECTS AND CHAOS THEORY 
Large Project management processes in mega-hydrocarbon 
projects are usually predetermined long before construction 
commences [12]. For example, cost and schedule estimates are 
invariably established during Front Engineering End Design 
(FEED), and are expected to be managed and controlled 
throughout the project implementation cycle [38]. Mega-
hydrocarbon projects are characteristically long in duration, 
complex and expensive in nature and are dependent on high 
levels of technical and technology usage. In some cases, 
technologies applied are either untested or bespoke. When 
technologies adopted are ‘off-the-shelf’, they need to be 
integrated into the project system in order to deliver its core 
goals [39]. For example, in the Kashagan oil and gas field 
development, conventional drilling and production 
technologies such as concrete structures or jacket platforms 
resting on the seabed (steel jacket) could not be used due to 
geological and geographical constraints. Instead, offshores 
facilities are installed on artificial islands (drilling islands and 
hub islands) to protect them harsh weather [40]. 
The essence of planning is to ensure that the activities 
necessary to achieve project objectives in terms of time, cost 
and quality can be identified ahead to determine appropriate 
implementation management process [41]. Nonetheless, long 
range planning increases the probability of inaccurate cost 
forecast occurrence [42], [43]. Such inaccuracies can 
negatively influence stakeholders’ confidence and their 
consequential decision to invest in such projects. It is 
suggested that the greater a project’s duration and complexity, 
the more likely that deterministic factors (used to make 
decisions such as those relating to cost) will vary. For 
instance, small changes in the initial conditions of a project’s 
cost system may result in dramatic changes in a system’s 
behaviour. 
As planning is discrete, it is a separate and distinct effort 
that is usually completed before the commencement of project 
execution [43], [44]. On the other hand, implementation and 
monitoring/controlling of activities established during 
planning phase are deemed to be continuous [38].This is 
because changes in plans are intermittently checked and 
corrected continually during implementation and 
monitoring/controlling phases in order to ensure that overall 
specific objectives are being achieved [38]. As such, problems 
created during planning phase may become catastrophic 
during project implementation [45]. The initial conditions of 
cost are usually determined by the information made available 
via the project management plan, charter, enterprise 
environmental factors and organisational process assets [13].  
The changeability of these conditions is more magnified 
during the project’s implementation phase. If a project’s 
budget conditions derived from the plans are not acted on 
during implementation, they will most likely remain in their 
state of inertia (inactivity). Although an initial error could 
occur during cost planning, this error is normally escalated 
during construction. In alignment with Chaos Theory, an error 
in the initial cost estimate for a mega-project could spark a 
chain reaction that generates a series of errors leading to an 
unforeseen escalation in project cost [46]. As a number of 
variables influence the initial conditions of a project’s cost, it 
is difficult with to isolate and effectively control their rate of 
change using traditional project management approaches [23]. 
This is due to conventional project management practices not 
having been sufficiently designed to track and control 
numerous changes that are capable of derailing projects’ 
objectives [22]. 
Variables that can create a disturbance in the initial 
conditions of a cost estimate for a typical mega-hydrocarbon 
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project are myriad and include: unknowable error during the 
cost estimation; unpredictability of project team behaviour; 
unanticipated changes in climatic conditions; political unrest, 
geographical conditions, exchange rate fluctuations, changes 
in legislation and unaccounted loss of productivity. These 
aforementioned variables can trigger spontaneous changes to 
initial conditions of the project cost thereby increasing the 
difference between estimated and actual project cost [25]. For 
example, a sudden and sharp rise in the value of currency of 
the project’s domicile country means foreign stakeholders may 
have to commit additional funds to ensure the asset is 
delivered.  
The decisions about the cost of a megaproject are usually 
based on the conditions identified during its gestation period 
[23]. At this stage, it may be difficult to ascertain or foresee 
any future change in the conditions. Project cost is usually 
estimated using established tools and techniques such as 
expert judgment, analogous estimating, parametric estimating, 
bottom-up estimating, three-point estimating and/ or, reserve 
analysis [47]. Estimating tools and techniques are only helpful 
in predicting the expected behaviour of cost elements in the 
future but they cannot actually prevent their changeability 
[33]. Any change to project’s initial conditions especially 
during the construction phase may catalyze a chain reaction. 
Such change could lead to unexpectedly significant changes to 
the cost and time dimensions of the entire project cycle [48]. 
The manifestation of chaos theory in project cost 
management means small changes in the initial cost conditions 
generate the need to make other changes to the estimates and 
baselines [49]. These changes may also necessitate other 
changes within the cost until the overall impact of the changes 
in project initial conditions on the cost estimates becomes very 
considerable. Uncertainty in project cost increases with time. 
This is expressed mathematically as:  
 
U = U0 eʎt                                      (1) 
 
where: U0 is the initial uncertainty that grows with time (t); e 
is the exponential constant that is an irrational number; and ʎ 
is the Lyapunov exponent which measures the rate of loss of 
information about the initial conditions of the project. The 
higher the value of Lyapunov exponent, the more chaotic the 
project system is. Lyapunov exponent is expressed as: 
 
ʎ	 ൌ 	 ଵ୲୬ି୲଴෍ ݈݊
ఋ	ሺ௧ሻ
ఋ଴ሺ௧ିଵሻ
௡
௞ୀଵ
                        (2) 
 
where: t0 is the time before the start of initial uncertainty in 
the project i.e. time before the loss of information about the 
project begins; tn is the time at which the uncertainty in the 
project becomes unmeasurable; k is the degree of 
independence of project initial conditions; and δ (t)/δ0 (t-1) is 
the measure the divergence as a result of small change in the 
initial conditions of the project.  
The evidence that cost management (which comprises cost 
planning, estimation, budget determination and cost 
controlling processes) is sensitive to initial conditions of a 
project can be expressed mathematically as:  
 
                                     Ṗ = ݂ [P]                                        (3) 
 
where: Ṗ is a function of an instantaneous state of the cost 
management (i.e. the rate of changes within the cost 
management process). This nonlinear and deterministic 
equation can be applied to predict the future state Pf of the 
project cost from the initial state P0 if only all future changes 
that will occur in the system can be determined in advance. 
Originally known information about a project is often 
explored to construct an overall cost estimate including 
provision of a contingency for uncertain costs that may occur 
[50]. Such cost estimates often include a determined 
contingency percentage that is assumed to provide buffer for 
unforeseen costs that may arise. However, it has been reported 
that traditional deterministic percentage approach is not be 
effective at selecting a cost contingency and the use of 
probability theory to calculate a cost contingency is more 
effective [51]. This is because projects are generally prone to 
errors of unanticipated commission or omission [52]. The 
consequential uncertainty (Uf) in the project’s initial 
conditions can be denoted by the probability density function 
(PDF) as: 
 
Uf = ρ (P, t0)                           (4) 
 
Considering the phase space of the project life cycle S, then 
the probability that the true initial state Ptrue of the project at 
the initial time t0 of the project lies within the phase space of 
the project life cycle S is given as: 
  
Ptrue = ʃs ρ (P, t0) ɗS                        (5) 
 
where ɗS is the change in the phase space of the project life 
cycle; ρ represents the value of two or more projects that cost 
the same amount and operating within the phase space of the 
project life cycle. From the determinism of equation 4, the 
probability that Ptrue lies within S is time constant.  
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE 
Professionals within the oil and gas sector can take some 
vital lessons from applying chaos theory to their megaprojects. 
This can assist them in understanding how cost overruns 
emerge in their megaprojects and then in designing as well as 
selecting practical strategies for managing the syndrome. On 
the first premise, practitioners undertaking hydrocarbon 
megaprojects should be aware that chaos theory demonstrates 
that such huge projects hardly obey simple linear rules 
because they are governed by close interactions of several 
events that are hard to know and manage. As a result, there is 
limit to which events within or around hydrocarbon 
megaprojects can be predicted and managed.  
In practice, chaos theory implies that the future state of a 
megaproject is sensitive to the small change in the initial 
condition of the megaproject [19]. This is so because 
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megaprojects as a dynamic system consist of several 
components, processes and tasks that are continually 
interdependent. These components, processes and tasks, 
having being predetermined long before the construction 
phase commences, cannot be predicted well enough. For 
instance, it would be difficult to establish from onset their 
behaviors right through the project life cycle. Despite that, 
those components, processes and tasks are expected to be 
managed and controlled throughout the project 
implementation cycle according to the requirements generated 
during the planning stage of the project process. As noted by 
[14], the long duration of megaprojects predispose them to 
increasing uncertainty that may hinder the achievement of the 
project objectives. The aforementioned circumstance can only 
be managed if the industry can design a validated strategy for 
assessing the long range behaviour of such change and its long 
term impact on the project. 
As the components, processes and tasks interact, they 
constantly create a continuum that is prone to changes. The 
ability of the megaproject team to follow up within the 
continuum is essential to monitoring and controlling several 
small changes that may pose threat to the objectives of the 
megaproject [53]. For example, an error in engineering design 
of a particular component of an oil and gas megaproject may 
be left undetected for a long period. As a result of this error, 
several other components of the megaproject will be affected 
because they are all closely interrelated. In this situation, an 
error in one component will manifest and affect several other 
ones until it results into catastrophic changes within the whole 
of megaproject system. Such changes will have cost 
implications for the megaproject and consequently triggering 
cost overruns. This is the backdrop against which practitioners 
within oil and gas megaprojects must pay attention to the issue 
of sensitive dependence that has been discussed within this 
paper. To address the issue of sensitive dependence in the oil 
and gas megaprojects, it is suggested that the practitioners 
continue to reinvent within their projects. By reinventing 
continually, practitioners may be able to detect and address 
issues before degenerating into substantial problems.  
Practitioners within the industry should also be aware of 
practical implications of positive feedback mechanism for 
hydrocarbon megaprojects. As discussed throughout this 
paper, megaprojects are undertaken within atmosphere of 
uncertainties. Several actions are usually incorporated to 
ensure active management of different components of 
megaprojects. While in the conventional management 
thinking, actions taken are expected to address the 
uncertainties inherent in megaprojects. This is known as 
negative feedback mechanism. In megaprojects setting, 
however, actions taken may lead to negative impacts or they 
can amplify problems. This is referred to as positive feedback 
mechanism. Hydrocarbon megaprojects are vulnerable to 
positive feedback mechanism because of many unknowns that 
are present in them. For instance, use of challenging or 
unproven technologies is normal in hydrocarbon megaprojects 
because they are technically complex and as such require 
novel approach for their successful delivery. Often times, 
applying these challenging or unproven technologies to 
megaprojects can be problematic thereby causing increased 
uncertainty and risk in them. This is because the technologies 
are new and as such there are uncertainties about their 
behaviour. In such situation, there is high probability of 
misapplication of certain areas of the technologies which can 
further magnify the existing uncertainties with the 
megaproject environments. 
Apart from sensitive dependence on initial conditions and 
positive feedback mechanism, bifurcation and catastrophic 
phase changes also have implications for hydrocarbon 
megaprojects. Radical shifts of changes made to the conditions 
of the megaprojects may cause qualitative modifications to the 
system. At this flash point, the megaprojects may either 
become stable system or chaotic one. For instance, change 
orders may create profound alterations to the flow of the 
processes within hydrocarbon megaprojects. Such sudden 
shifts can lead to several changes across many other 
components of the megaprojects. However, the hydrocarbon 
megaprojects will maintain their original stability for a certain 
period until they transit into total disorder. Total disorder will 
only occur when the megaprojects can no longer maintain 
their stability as a result of change orders being made at 
intervals that the systems cannot accommodate. 
Finally, implications of strange attractors for practice in 
hydrocarbon megaprojects cannot be overemphasized. Despite 
the chaotic behaviour associated with megaprojects, they also 
have capacity to self-organize into order. For instance, error in 
the offshore reservoir definition can lead to selection of wrong 
technology and consequently causing catastrophic change to 
the megaproject. After undergoing this chaotic change, new 
delivery pattern will be created for the megaproject. In this 
case, new order is created and the megaproject can still 
progress towards achieving its objectives although via 
different delivery pattern or strategy from the one planned 
originally. In megaprojects, such situation can be repeated 
many times during their implementation thereby increasing the 
chance of different outcomes within the systems. As a result of 
changing delivery patterns in the megaprojects, cost overruns 
may be experienced. This is because extra cost is incurred to 
manage changes in the delivery pattern of the megaprojects.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Several studies previously undertaken produced promising 
results as to why cost overruns occur in megaprojects, 
however, the literature fails to cover how cost overruns 
develop within mega hydrocarbon projects. Understanding 
how cost overruns emerge in mega hydrocarbon projects is a 
challenging task that needs to look beyond conventional 
reasons often attributed to cost overruns in megaprojects. The 
critical literature review conducted in this paper, has 
highlighted the implications of chaos theory as a tool to be 
used in developing strategies to manage cost overruns across 
megaprojects. To understand how cost overruns develop 
within mega hydrocarbon projects, the behaviour of 
megaproject system must be first understood. It has also 
emphasized the need for both academic and industry 
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communities to reappraise their understanding of how cost 
overruns occur within megaprojects through the lens of chaos 
theory. Although chaos theory is yet to be studied within 
construction and project management field, there is anecdotal 
evidence to suggest that the development of cost overruns is 
impacted by this theory. 
Future research is now required to focus upon empirical 
study that can identify how cost overrun can be predicted and 
its risk mitigated using the lenses of chaos theory. Studying 
how cost overruns develop through the concept of chaos 
theory will not only provide the ‘outside’ view but ‘inside’ 
view of how cost overruns develop within megaprojects. 
Developing better understanding of the origins of cost 
overruns is the first step towards combatting this recurrent 
problem in practice. Not only will such research potentially 
raise profitability margins for contractors but could also 
increase profit margins for other stakeholders.  
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